This paper documents significantly negative stock price reactions to shareholder initiated class action lawsuits. We find that shareholders partially anticipate these lawsuits based on lawsuit filings against other firms in the same industry and capitalize part of these losses prior to a lawsuit filing date. Consequently, we show that filing date effects understate the magnitude of shareholder losses on average by approximately a third. We demonstrate that prior expectations about the likelihood of being sued are important determinants of the losses anticipated prior to the filing of an actual lawsuit, and on the lawsuit filing date.
Introduction
An important ingredient of recent financial scandals in the United States has been alleged securities fraud arising from a material misstatement or omission of fact. Typically, such events are detected through government enforcement actions or private legal actions. Securities class action lawsuits that originate from private litigation are generally considered a necessary supplement to the Securities and Exchange Commission's enforcement actions.
These lawsuits are also important from the perspective of corporate governance and specifically shareholder rights. The decision to pursue the right to sue the company, its officers and directors and initiate class action litigation in the event of a material misstatement or omission of fact is, to a large extent, only pursued when corporate governance mechanisms and other methods of redress have failed.
Despite the perception that class action lawsuits are stop-gap measures, this form of litigation is used on a regular basis. 1 The Securities Class Action Lawsuit Clearinghouse (http://www.securities.stanford.edu) at Stanford University (which tracks federal securities class action lawsuits since 1996), reports that 1,915 class action lawsuits were filed over the period 1996 through 2003 with litigation peaking in 2001 when 493 suits were filed.
2 Surprisingly, shareholder initiated lawsuits have received relatively little attention. The available evidence is based on relatively small samples which limit the power to draw crosssectional inferences. Romano (1991) provides the first comprehensive analysis of shareholder class action suits. She examines share price reactions to the initiation of 66 shareholder suits during 1966-1987 and the resulting changes in compensation and corporate governance structures as well as managerial turnover. Most importantly for our study, she finds little 1 The regular incidence of such litigation is also consistent with the financial incentives of a plaintiff law firm to pursue securities litigation (on behalf of shareholders) so as to earn lucrative fees in the event of a settlement or a successful outcome at trial.
2 Some of the litigation activity in 2001 relates to the alleged improper behavior of underwriters in initial public offerings (see Table 1 for details). In these suits, plaintiffs assert that a number of practices related to providing share allocations were not disclosed and harmed investors. For example, in a series of "IPO laddering" cases, underwriters provided initial share allocations to preferred customers in exchange for which these customers agreed to purchase additional shares in the aftermarket at pre-determined prices. Since these attempts to provide "price support" were not disclosed, post-IPO investors are damaged when they trade at these artificially high prices. 1 evidence of significant price reactions at the initiation of lawsuits (-0.41%).
Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) examine whether firms that preemptively disclose adverse earnings news early benefit from a lower incidence of shareholder initiated lawsuits.
They investigate a set of 44 firms in biotech, computer, electronics, and retail industries from 1988-1992 that were subject to securities class action lawsuits triggered by adverse earnings reports. They document excess returns of -17.16% on the adverse earnings announcement event. Since a majority of these firms voluntarily disclose adverse earnings news ahead of the mandatory earnings announcement dates (relative to a control sample of firms), they conclude that early disclosures increase litigation risk. However, Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) document that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to disclose early in an attempt to preempt potential lawsuits, and that such early disclosures decrease (rather than increase) the risk of being sued.
We analyze shareholder initiated class action lawsuits in this paper using a significantly larger sample than that employed in other studies. Our lawsuit sample covers a broad range of industries and types of lawsuits (see Table 1 ) from 1996-2003. Not only do we examine price reactions on the lawsuit filing date, but we consider the possibility that these lawsuits signal that comparable firms are susceptible to similar lawsuits. If true, we expect these comparable firms to have negative stock price reactions that are significantly related to the probability of being sued.
We develop an econometric model for the propensity to be sued based on both firm and industry-specific factors. We show that shareholder wealth losses on the date that the filing of a lawsuit is announced are understated because investors partially anticipate these lawsuits and capitalize part of the losses in advance. In this regard, our methodology is consistent with the literature on conditional event study methods that emphasizes the role of explicitly conditioning for the expected information (i.e., partial anticipation of lawsuits) in estimating announcement effects, and concludes that the probability of an event (i.e., of being sued in our case) is, as we find in this study, significantly related to the announcement effect on the event date (see, for example, Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) , and Prabhala (1997) ).
While other studies have examined whether investors partially anticipate corporate events, such as acquisitions (Schipper and Thompson (1983) , Malatesta and Thompson (1985) , Song and Walkling (2000)) and debt offerings (Chaplinsky and Hansen (1993)), they typically are based on only firm-specific information. In contrast to these studies, we incorporate 'contagion' or spillover effects based on industry-specific information, such as the influence of the litigation environment and the lawsuit type in determining both the propensity of a firm to be sued and the associated shareholder losses. One advantage of incorporating industry spillover into the analysis is that it allows us to evaluate whether investors partially anticipate future lawsuits when they observe lawsuit filings at other firms in the same industry. Our analysis of partial anticipation effects considers whether industry events alter the probability of a firm being sued and the anticipated shareholder losses.
In early work on partial anticipation in the context of acquisitions, Schipper and Thompson (1983) argue that specific acquisitions are often embedded within general programs of acquisition, and that future acquisitions within these programs are anticipated. Consequently, the present value of individual acquisition events would then be fully reflected, i.e., capitalized in stock prices at the inception of the program. Malatesta and Thompson (1985) present a formal model of stock price reactions to events that investors partially anticipate.
In their empirical analysis, they examine a sample of thirty firms that make serial acquisitions and find some evidence that investors partially anticipate future acquisition attempts based on firm-specific information of the acquirer. In contrast with our analysis, they do not estimate the probability of an acquisition attempt, nor do they test whether this probability is related to the announcement date effect. In our study, we specifically focus on the relation between investor reactions and the probability of being sued and demonstrate that prior expectations about the likelihood of being sued are indeed significant determinants of the anticipated losses prior to the filing of an actual lawsuit, and on the lawsuit filing date. 3 Since private litigation is generally considered a necessary supplement to government enforcement actions that are designed to limit securities fraud, our study is closely related to Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2007) who document that the stock market imposes significant reputational penalties on firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentations. Our study complements their work and suggests that the reputational penalties could be even larger if one were to include the industry spillover effects associated with similar enforcement actions against other firms within the same industry.
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Our main findings are as follows. First, investors partially anticipate lawsuits based on firm-specific and industry-specific information and rationally capitalize losses prior to the filing of a lawsuit. Second, we show that filing date effects understate the magnitude of shareholder losses on average by approximately a third. Finally, we demonstrate that prior expectations about the likelihood of being sued are important determinants of the losses anticipated prior to the filing of an actual lawsuit, and on the lawsuit filing date. In particular, shareholder losses prior to a lawsuit filing date ('partial anticipation effect') are positively related to the propensity to be sued. Furthermore, since the filing of a lawsuit removes residual uncertainty, losses on the lawsuit filing date ('filing date effect') are negatively related to the propensity to be sued.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the sample. Section 3 describes the estimation of economic effects. Section 4 describes the measurement of industry spillover effects of shareholder suits. Section 5 explains the estimation of cumulative shareholder losses associated with shareholder lawsuits. Section 6 presents a model of the propensity of a firm to be sued by shareholders. Sections 7 and 8 respectively present our results of investor reactions to the filing of a lawsuit on the sued firms and non-sued firms. Section 9 offers our conclusions.
returns are higher for firms that have a high likelihood of being acquired subsequently. 4 Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1994), Bijzak and Coles (1995), and Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles (1998) examine the wealth effects of interfirm lawsuits (rather than securities class action lawsuits) during 1981-83, 1973-83, and 1981-83 respectively. They find that defendant firms experience statistically significant negative price reactions on the lawsuit initiation date. 4 
Sample Selection and Data Description
Our initial sample is comprised of 1,915 securities class action lawsuits that are drawn from a chronological listing available at the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website for the years 1996 through 2003. 5 The sample is then restricted to the 1,620 firms whose daily stock returns are included in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns file on the lawsuit filing date. We also require firms to be included in the Execucomp data base, which further reduces our sample to 605 filings against 488 firms. The number of companies is lower than the number of filings because some firms are sued multiple times.
Our initial analysis on shareholder losses around a lawsuit filing date uses the full sample of 605 filings. However, our subsequent analysis that estimates the probability of being sued and its relation to lawsuit-related shareholder losses requires that firms (both sued and non-sued) also be available on Compustat, and First Call. This reduces the sample for such analysis to 377 class action lawsuits against 310 different firms.
6 Table 1 provides information about the number of class action lawsuits across different industries. 7 Panel A shows that the lawsuit filing rate increases over the sample period.
Some of this increase is driven by litigation in the financial services industry (shown under Questionable FI Practices). For example, suits that were filed against underwriters for their role in taking firms public.
We also classify lawsuits according to type. This determination is made by reading supporting documentation available on the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse website, such as the plaintiff's complaint and subsequent amendments to the complaint for each lawsuit in our sample. In cases where the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse did not provide 5 We downloaded the data from http://securities.stanford.edu/comp-date.shtml on May 16, 2004 . 6 We lose a significant number of observations because we use a number of additional data sets, such as Execucomp, Compustat and First Call, to construct certain explanatory variables. However, our results are robust to using the sample of CRSP-only firms, albeit the explanatory power of our regressions (in Tables 6  and 7) is lower for the sample CRSP-only firms despite its larger sample size. 7 In an approach that is similar to Field Table 1 shows the distribution of the most common types of lawsuits by year. The first two categories in Panel B correspond to whether an alleged fraud is related to a firm's accounting procedures (e.g., improper recognition of revenue) or to its operations (e.g., production problems). The next two categories relate to external business conditions (e.g., an economy-wide reduction in capital spending) and questionable practices at financial institutions that have been a subject of recent litigation, such as analyst conflicts of interest, and IPO laddering cases. Generally, we find a substantial increase in both financial intermediary and accounting-related lawsuits during 2001-2003. 8 
Calculation of Economic Effects
Investors file federal securities class-action lawsuits following the disclosure of a material misstatement or omission of fact. Since these disclosures are invariably bad news, stock prices are expected to decline. There are two components to this expected loss: 1) a response to the incremental information contained in the announcement that triggers the lawsuit and 2) the deadweight loss associated with the damage awards that are likely to be paid to impaired shareholders. Since it is difficult to decompose the stock price reaction into its separate components, our analysis reflects the combined effects.
Measurement of Abnormal Returns
We follow standard event study methodology and measure the share price response to the lawsuit filing date over the event period using the market model as the pricing benchmark.
Daily abnormal returns are computed as the actual return minus the market model predicted return:
where R jt is the rate of return on stock j over day t and R mt is the corresponding rate of return on the value-weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ companies on the CRSP tape over day t. 
where t i is the filing date for industry lawsuit i. We evaluate the statistical significance of these CARs using the methodology of Brown and Warner (1985) that considers both the time-series and cross-sectional dependence in returns.
The choice of an event window [τ 1 , τ 2 ] is an important estimation issue because the time between the lawsuit trigger date and the actual filing date depends on the nature of the disclosure event. 9 In some cases, the trigger and filing dates are expected to be roughly coincident. For example, there is little reason to expect a long delay if a company issues a press release disclosing that significant improprieties have occurred. By contrast, if the existence of an impropriety is harder to detect, it may take investors longer than a day or two to determine whether the trigger event contains sufficient evidence to warrant initiating litigation.
Since investors are likely to partially anticipate the economic effects of a potential lawsuit on the trigger date, the choice of the event window determines whether we capture the partial anticipation of an impending lawsuit on a trigger date or only reflect the resolution of residual uncertainty as investors adjust to the incremental information on the filing date. 
Measurement of Economic Effects in Dollars
We also convert the daily abnormal returns into an estimate of the economic dollar effect for each event. The daily economic dollar effect for firm j at date t is computed as:
where P jt−1 is the market capitalization of firm j's equity on date t − 1. Daily economic dollar effects are cumulated over the event window to determine the cumulative economic effect. For example, the cumulative economic effect CEE ij for firm j and lawsuit i over [τ 1 , τ 2 ] is computed as: shareholder wealth. In the two-week period preceding the filing date, stock prices decline -9.79%, which represents an additional loss of $727.01 million. 11 The large losses preceding the filing date are likely due to the disclosure of material adverse information that actually serves as the event that triggers the filing of a lawsuit. 12 The market appears to process the incremental information in an efficient manner because cumulative abnormal returns are insignificantly different from zero in the two-week period immediately following the lawsuit filing date. At some level, the magnitude of these losses may be somewhat surprising because firms carry insurance that is designed to defray the cost of class action lawsuits. This observation is reinforced by the fact that industry experts believe that settlement amounts are highly correlated with policy limits. In fact, there is a perception in the legal community that class action lawsuits are only adjudicated after negotiations between plaintiff and defendant attorneys break down. 13 One explanation is that damage awards will be eventually recovered by insurance companies in the form of higher premium payments. As a result, investors naturally capitalize these losses even though they require no immediate cash flows. Another contributing factor is that other non-damage related costs, such as (defense) attorney fees, lost management time, and loss of reputation, can be substantial, which provide additional motivation for investors to capitalize such losses.
Industry Spillover
This section measures the stock market reactions to the filing of security class action lawsuits on other firms in the same industry. Industry feedback or "spillover" in our study is based on the idea that many lawsuits are filed in response to events that likely affect the entire industry. For example, the investment banking industry was subject to a number of lawsuits related to the practice of "IPO laddering" and "spinning". Investment banks are particularly predisposed to industry spillover because underwriters are highly competitive and successful business practices are emulated by other firms. As a result, once a lawsuit is filed, investors infer that other underwriters are likely to be engaged in similar practices and adjust the prices of related firms downward based on their propensity to be sued.
the average stock price decline preceding the filing of a Section 10(b) claim was about 19%." In a typical securities class action under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934 Act") and SEC Rule 10b-5, such as those analyzed in this study, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants made material misrepresentations about a company or failed to disclose material facts through uniform public statements. 13 These observations are based on private communications with legal experts at Lexecon and Chicago Partners.
Industry spillover also is likely to be a factor in depressed industries where firms are more likely to manipulate accounting earnings to hide poor operating performance. When such management is detected at one firm, damaged investors typically file a class action lawsuit. The initiation of this lawsuit signals to investors that suits against other firms are forthcoming, and the stock prices of related firms are adjusted downward accordingly.
The importance of industry spillover has been documented in other contexts, such as corporate bankruptcy filings and federal antitrust actions. For example, Lang and Stulz (1992) document industry spillover for firms filing for bankruptcy. They show that bankruptcy filing announcements typically result in a lowering of stock prices of other firms in the industry. However, where firms compete with the firm announcing a bankruptcy filing, such firms are shown to experience an increase in stock prices. That is, some of the industry spillover effect in their study is a result of a change in the competitive equilibrium in that industry. The industry spillover effect for class action suit i as the average cumulative abnormal returns for all firms in the same industry excluding the firm being sued is calculated as
where J is the number of firms in the same four-digit SIC code as the sued firm.
Panel A of Panel A also reveals a significant abnormal return of -0.45% (at the 10% level) for the non-sued firms during [+2, +10]. This is somewhat disconcerting because Table 2 reports an insignificant abnormal return of +0.31% for sued firms during the same period. This seems to suggest that one could profit from shorting all non-sued firms in an industry whenever a securities class action lawsuit is announced.
Although a possibility, a more realistic explanation is that confounding effects, such as simultaneous negative earnings announcements may cause the negative abnormal returns. If true, the results documented in Table 3 may reflect the effect of earnings disappointments among the non-sued firms rather than industry spillover effects. In other words, industrywide earnings disappointments are likely to be correlated with shareholder initiated lawsuits because lawsuit filings frequently occur when a firm is doing poorly, and when one firm is doing poorly, chances are that the entire industry is doing poorly.
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To control for potentially confounding earnings announcements, we obtain quarterly earnings announcements from Compustat and remove sued and non-sued firms with earnings announcements that coincide with the lawsuit filing date. The results are presented in Panel B
of Table 3 . We continue to find evidence of a spillover effect on the non-sued firms surrounding lawsuit filings. For example, Panel B of Table 3 industry CAR of -0.39% is not statistically significant at conventional levels. In other words, once we remove sued and non-sued firms with simultaneous earnings announcements, there 15 These results are qualitatively unchanged when we estimate industry spillover using all non-sued firms in CRSP (i.e., not limited to firms in Execucomp) in the same 4-digit SIC code as that of the sued firm. 16 We thank a referee for drawing our attention to this issue and its link to the industry spillover.
are no (statistically) significant profits to be made from the trading strategy considered above. 17 In subsequent regression analysis, we find that our results are robust to excluding sued and non-sued firms with earnings announcements during the lawsuit announcement window − see Section 7.2.1 for details.
It is possible that the industry spillover is affected by the type of lawsuit. Rather than empirically catalogue industry spillover effects by suit type, we develop a model for the propensity to be sued based on firm-specific characteristics, litigation environment and lawsuit type (see Sections 6 and 7.2.3 for details), and show that the propensity to be sued is a significant determinant of the shareholder losses anticipated prior to the filing of an actual lawsuit, and on the lawsuit filing date.
Cumulative Own Effects
The calculation of "own" effects and industry spillover effects are cross-sectional measures based on the filing date. Since investors may have partially anticipated the lawsuit, even prior to this particular lawsuit's filing date, other studies that only focus on filing date returns underestimate the true economic costs associated with class action lawsuits. In this section, we estimate this cumulative "own" effect by combining the filing date effect and all of the firm-specific industry spillover effects that precede a filing. For each filing date, we consider the entire history of lawsuits that have been previously filed in the same industry since the beginning of our sample period. For robustness, we also consider a shorter history of lawsuits, such as those that are filed in the same industry within the past year.
The cumulative own effect is defined as
where P A ij [τ 1 , τ 2 ] denotes the partial anticipation for suit i that is filed against firm j and is calculated as
In the event that a firm has been sued multiple times, the partial anticipation calculation is reset to zero after each lawsuit. Figure 1 illustrates this calculation for a firm that is sued twice. Gray boxes indicate dates on which firm j is sued and represent the own effect component; white boxes indicate dates on which other firms in the same industry are sued. Table 4 presents estimates of the cumulative own effects which reflect the summation of own effects and partial anticipation due to industry spillover. The three-day average cumulative own effect is -7.28% (t-stat of -7.53), which corresponds to a mean dollar loss of $477.75 million. This indicates that, if one fails to consider partial anticipation, own effects in Table 2 One limitation of our estimation approach is that we estimate the cumulative own effect based on firm-specific industry spillover effects that precede the filing date. Since some of these lawsuits may have been filed in the distant past, our estimate of the partial anticipation component may include spillover effects that have no bearing on the current lawsuit.
To control for the possibility that previous lawsuits become less relevant as they age, we present truncated cumulative own effect estimates that only include prior lawsuits that were filed within the past N years. Panels B and C in Table 4 respectively report estimates based on one and two year truncation periods. The results are smaller but comparable to the "all-inclusive" estimates.
We replicate all of the analysis in the paper using these truncated estimates and obtain qualitatively similar results. Consequently, we only report results for the all inclusive estimates.
6 The propensity to be sued
To examine whether shareholders partially anticipate lawsuits, we begin by estimating the propensity to be sued using a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to one if the firm is sued and zero otherwise. The final sample includes 377 class action lawsuits and 5,687 control firm observations. The control firms represent all firms in the Execucomp database that have the same four-digit SIC code, the same fiscal year end as the sued firm, and have the relevant data from Compustat, Execucomp, and First Call. In Section 7, we use the estimate of propensity to be sued from the probit model in the regression analysis to determine whether the capitalized losses are increasing in the likelihood of a lawsuit.
Discussion of explanatory variables
The propensity to be sued is estimated using factors that correlate with the size of the potential damages, the litigation environment, and firm-specific characteristics. We organize the following discussion of the explanatory variables along these lines.
Size of Potential Damages
The probability that a firm is sued depends upon the size of the potential damages. We use a number of factors as proxies for the size of the potential damage awards. The standard methodology for computing damage awards specifically considers share turnover and past 14 volatility (see, for example Dyl (1999) ). 19 Higher levels of both factors increase the likelihood that shareholders purchased shares based on misleading information.
20
Share turnover reflects the probability that a share was traded within a given time period.
We estimate the share turnover factor using the procedure defined in Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) over the six-month estimation window used in the event study in Section 3.1, i.e., [-135,-11] . Table 5 indicates that the mean probability that a share is traded in the six-month estimation window is 61.45%. Volatility is estimated as the daily standard deviation of the rate of return in the same six-month estimation window preceding the filing date. The mean daily volatility for the full sample is 4.09%.
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Prior stock returns have also been shown to be related to plaintiff's incentives to bring a lawsuit. Jones and Weingram (1996) have shown that firms with good stock price performance in the recent past are less likely to be sued by shareholders. On average, prior stock returns, measured over the same six-month estimation period preceding the lawsuit filing date, are positive for the full sample. Panel A of Table 5 shows that mean returns are 6.00%.
However, Panel B of Table 5 indicates that prior stock returns averaged -13.22% for sued firms and 7.30% for non-sued firms, and the difference in means is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Litigation Environment
We include a number of factors that relate to the current litigation environment. These include measures of firm-specific litigation activity, industry litigation activity, and controls for specific industries that are expected to have different exposures to litigation risk.
To track past litigation activity, we create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has been sued previously and 0 otherwise. We predict that a firm is more likely to be sued if it has been sued in the past. This is essentially a "bad behavior" hypothesis. That is, once management is caught making misrepresentations, investors infer that other problems may also come to light that will result in additional litigation.
A second litigation environment factor is the frequency of litigation within the industry.
We measure litigation intensity as the number of class action lawsuits that have been filed against firms in the same four-digit SIC code over the past six months prior to the lawsuit filing date. In addition to the litigation intensity variable, we also include its squared term in the regressions in this study to capture potential non-linearities. Table 5 indicates that, on average, there have been 2.22 lawsuits within the past six months across all industries.
Since Table 1 has shown that the rate of litigation can be quite high for certain industries, we include industry dummy variables for regulated, financial, technology and retail firms (see footnote 7 for how these variables are constructed) following the approach used by Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005). 22 We expect the rate of lawsuits to be higher in the financial industry because financial firms have direct relations with customers and nonperformance is more likely to result in litigation. By contrast, the additional monitoring that accompanies firms subject to regulatory oversight should result in a lower rate of lawsuit filings for regulated firms. We also include a control for technology firms because the greater level of uncertainty about future prospects is likely to result in more lawsuits.
Finally, Field, Lowry, and Shu (2005) argue that lawsuits are less likely to be filed against retail firms because they tend to release monthly sales figures, meaning that the market has better information about their current operating environment and is thus less likely to be surprised with bad news. However, retail firms sell products to individuals and tend to have large labor forces, both of which are likely to result in a broader share ownership. Since the risk of litigation is high when large number of shareholders are involved, these firms may have incentives to prevent this type of adverse information from being released to investors, which is expected to lead to higher filing rates. Given both possibilities, the expected rate of lawsuit filings for retail firms is indeterminate.
Firm-Specific Factors
There are many firm-specific factors that may affect the probability of being sued by shareholders in a class action lawsuit. The first variable controls for "deep pockets" and is measured as the natural log of the market capitalization of equity. Since large firms are better able to pay larger amounts if cases have unfavorable resolutions (e.g., when a firm agrees to a settle a lawsuit rather than go to trial), they are more likely to be sued. This hypothesis should hold even when firms carry insurance to defray litigation costs, since firm size is likely to be highly correlated with the undisclosed policy limit; the latter is believed by industry experts to be highly correlated with the settlement amount.
Unexpectedly bad earnings performance also is more likely to lead to the filing of a lawsuit. We estimate two measures of unexpected earnings. The first is the level of discretionary accruals from a modified Jones model. 23 Since earnings tend to mean revert, we also include two lags of discretionary accruals. Panel A of Table 5 indicates that mean discretionary accruals are positive, meaning that firms tend to over-report earnings. Panel B of Table 5 indicates that there is no significant difference in discretionary accruals for sued and non-sued firms.
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The second measure of unexpected earnings is standardized unexpected earnings (SUE).
We estimate unexpected earnings as the difference between actual quarterly earnings and the First Call consensus earnings estimate for the quarter immediately preceding the lawsuit filing date. Unexpected earnings are then scaled by the standard deviation of the consensus earnings forecast as reported by First Call. Since the standard deviation of the consensus earnings forecast can be quite small, the estimate of SUE can be large in absolute value. To control for this tendency, we winsorize the SUE estimates at -6 and 6. For the full sample, the mean SUE is a positive 0.6912. We expect that firms announcing unexpectedly bad earnings are more likely to be sued. Consistent with this observation, Panel B of Table 5 indicates that the mean SUEs for sued and non-sued firms are -0.0239 and 0.7382, respectively. If firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely to be sued, we predict a negative association between the propensity to be sued and SUEs.
We also include the percentage of total CEO compensation from bonuses to control for the structure of the compensation plan. 25 In general, we expect that bonus compensation provides an incentive for managers to produce better operating results. The stronger the incentive for managers to perform well, the less likely it is for a firm to be sued. We therefore expect a negative relation between the propensity to be sued and the proportion of bonus compensation. Using the Execucomp database, it is measured as the proportion of bonus compensation to total compensation (the sum of the dollar values of salary, bonus, other compensation, savings plans, properties and insurance, long-term incentive payments, restricted stocks and stock options).
Despite this general tendency for bonuses to provide positive incentives for managers to perform well, there is a possible adverse effect related to bonus compensation. Specifically, managers that have relatively high levels of bonus-based compensation may be more likely accruals for sued firms to be positively correlated at all lags. Partially consistent with this, we find that the correlation (not reported in Table 5 ) between contemporaneous discretionary accruals and the first and second lag are 0.07 (p-value equal to 0.1294) and 0.31 (p-value equal to 0.0001). 25 The structure of the CEO's compensation contract has been shown to have an important effect on the likelihood of a firm engaging in unusual accounting practices that result in a restatement of financial statements. See Burns and Kedia (2006) , and Roell and Peng (2006) for details.
to misstate earnings to achieve certain incentive targets. We control for this possibility by including a term that interacts the percentage of total compensation from bonuses with a dummy variable that takes the value one when return on assets is negative and zero otherwise.
The more bonus compensation a manager receives when firm operating performance is poor the more likely a firm is to be sued.
The final firm-specific factor is the extent of CEO share ownership. If management's interests are already aligned with shareholders as a result of their existing share ownership, the firm may be less likely to take actions that lead to a lawsuit. The total shares held by the CEO is measured as the sum of shares outstanding in option grants, unexercised options, and current shares held by CEOs divided by total shares outstanding plus options held by CEOs. Since most firms have low CEO ownership when ownership is measured as a percentage of total shares held by the CEO, we try three different measures of ownership. 6.2 Parameter estimates of the propensity to be sued model Table 6 provides parameter estimates for four class-action lawsuit models. The first three models present probit estimations that respectively consider the size of potential damages, the litigation environment and firm specific factors. The fourth, or Full, model combines the potential damages, litigation environment, and firm-specific factors. We report significance levels based on standard errors that adjust for heteroscedasticity, and filing date clustering.
Adjustments are made for filing date clustering because firms may be sued on the same date and, it is, therefore, inappropriate to assume that these events are independent.
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The fifth column reports the marginal change in the propensity to be sued for marginal changes in the explanatory variables. The marginal effects are calculated at the means of the independent variables. For the dummy variables, the marginal effect is calculated as the discrete change as the dummy variable changes from zero to one.
Since the coefficient estimates for the Full Model are qualitatively similar to those for the first three models, we only discuss the Full Model results accompanied by p-values (in place of the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels reported in Table 6 ). As we shall see, the model estimates accord well with our predictions.
Consistent with expectations, firms that are more likely to have higher damage awards are more likely to be sued. We find that firms are more likely to be sued if they have higher share turnover (p-value of 0.0001). Also, firms with relatively high stock returns prior to the lawsuit filing date are less likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0001).
We also find the litigation environment affects the likelihood that a firm is sued. As expected, the coefficient estimate for the previous lawsuit dummy (p-value of 0.0001) suggests that the firms are likely to be sued if they have been previously sued. Interestingly, industry litigation activity has important non-linear effects. We find that firms operating in industries that have recently experienced heightened litigation activity (as measured by the squared term of litigation intensity, defined as the number of class action lawsuits that have been filed against firms in the same four-digit SIC code over the past six months prior to the lawsuit filing date) are more likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0001), whereas moderate levels of litigation activity (as measured by the litigation intensity variable) are associated with a lower (rather than a higher) likelihood of a firm being sued (p-value of 0.0001).
With the exception of the tech firm dummy, all of the industry controls are statistically significant and have the expected sign. Consistent with our assertion that companies dealing with individuals are more likely to be sued, the retail dummy variable is positive.
Larger firms are more likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0001), which supports the "deep pockets" hypothesis. In addition, profitable firms are less likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0179), and firms that provide investors with "good news" on earnings announcement dates are also less likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0001).
Not surprisingly, firms that pay managers relatively high bonuses are less likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0001). However, firms that continue to pay managers relatively high bonuses even after the firm experiences poor operating performance are more likely to be sued (p-value of 0.0042). The coefficient estimate for the CEO share ownership is negative as expected and is statistically different from zero at the 10% level.
7 Determinants of Stock Price Reactions for Sued Firms
We have already shown that stock price reactions are significantly negative for both sued firms and non-sued firms in the same industry, and that a significant amount of the total price reaction has been previously anticipated by investors prior to the actual filing of the lawsuit. The purpose of this section is to examine whether the size of the price reaction is related to the propensity to be sued as well as other factors used to estimate the lawsuit propensity model in Section 6.
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To do this, we propose a number of hypotheses based on the propensity to be sued and the magnitude of the economic losses around lawsuit filing dates. Section 7.1 presents the results of regression analysis for sued firms. Specifically, whether the level of partial anticipation, the filing date effect, and the cumulative own effects are related to the propensity to be sued in the 29 The statistical significance is stronger with the two alternative measures of share ownership (not shown separately in tables). When we use the natural log of one plus the market value of share ownership in millions of dollars our results are significant at the 1% level. For the market value of ownership as a fraction of yearly compensation, the coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level. In subsequent empirical analysis of our main hypotheses regarding partial anticipation and filing date effects, our results are qualitatively unchanged when we use either of these alternative measures in place of CEO ownership measured in market value terms (millions of dollars). 30 The literature on conditional event study methods predicts a relation between the stock price reaction and the propensity to be sued. See the introduction for more details.
hypothesized manner. Section 7.2 extends this analysis by examining the relation between the fraction of the cumulative own effect that is partially anticipated and the propensity to be sued (i.e., redefines partial anticipation as a fraction).
Regression analysis of sued firms
This section determines whether the propensity to be sued affects investor reactions to the news that specific firms are sued. We estimate cross-sectional regressions of partial anticipation (firm-specific industry spillover) in the period preceding the filing of a class action lawsuit, the filing date effect, and cumulative own effects (the sum of firm-specific industry spillover and the filing date effect) using explanatory variables that include the propensity to be sued, potential damage factors, 31 litigation environment factors, and firmspecific factors. 32 Since we expect lawsuits to convey negative news to the market, we multiply all three measures by −1 so that we can interpret the estimates as losses. This makes the coefficient estimates easier to interpret.
Partial Anticipation (Firm-Specific Industry Spillover)
When a given firm in the industry is sued, it signals to investors that other firms in the industry may be subject to similar lawsuits. Investors then determine the likelihood that these related firms may be sued and capitalize the expected loss.
For those firms that are actually sued, the aggregate level of the expected loss that is partially anticipated is predicted to be positively associated with the propensity to be sued.
That is, 31 We use the length of the class period, stock volatility, and share turnover to estimate damages based on models used by class action litigators. It is well-known that these models are significantly biased upward. Conventional wisdom has it that these models are quite useful for demonstrating that traders were damaged, but they are not particularly accurate in assessing the actual settlement amounts. In practice, once both parties agree that a fraud has been committed, settlements are highly correlated with insurance policy limits. We included damage estimates from a proportional trader model (Dyl (1999)) in our cross-sectional regressions of filing date effects and cumulative own effects and do not find significant relations.
32 See Equations (7), (2), and (6) for the definition of partial anticipation, the filing date effect, and the cumulative own effect respectively. Hypothesis 1 (Partial Anticipation Hypothesis) For sued firms, the level of partial anticipation prior to the lawsuit filing date is positively related to the propensity to be sued. Table 7 reports the results of the Partial Anticipation regressions. As expected, the size of the firm-specific industry spillover effect is positively related to the probability of being sued. The coefficient on Lawsuit Propensity (the fitted value from the probit model) is 1.7222 (p-value of 0.016).
Spillover effects are negatively related to the previous lawsuit dummy (p-value of 0.032).
This suggests that investors believe that these firms are more likely to have learned from past mistakes and have taken actions designed to prevent similar situations in the future. The fact these firms are being sued again (see Table 6 ) implies that this faith is misplaced. Not surprisingly, the spillover effect is more pronounced in industries that experience periods of heightened litigation activity (p-value of 0.010), albeit it has the opposite effect for excessively high industry litigation activity (as measured by the squared term of litigation intensity).
We also show that, even though large firms are more likely to be sued because they are better able to pay damage claims, expected losses are smaller (p-value 0.005) on a relative basis and less costly to shareholders. One possible explanation for larger firms bearing smaller losses is they are better equipped to defend shareholder initiated lawsuits.
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None of the variables that control for managerial compensation incentives are significant determinants of the partial anticipation effect beyond that already reflected in the propensity score.
Filing Date Effect
Once a firm is sued, the market reaction is affected by the incremental information contained in the announcement and the extent to which the lawsuit was previously anticipated. Although it may seem somewhat paradoxical, we expect to observe a negative relation between the propensity to be sued and the stock market reaction.
The intuition here is that, if the market already places a very high probability on a lawsuit, it will have already capitalized most of the expected loss. Since very little residual uncertainty is resolved on the lawsuit filing date, investors' responses will be relatively small. By contrast, if the probability of being sued is low and the firm is sued, there will be a bigger price reaction. This implies that, Hypothesis 2 (Filing Date Hypothesis) The filing date effect is negatively related to the propensity to be sued. Table 7 indicate that, as predicted, the coefficient for Lawsuit Propensity is negative (coefficient estimate = -1.0749 and p-value = 0.001). Similar to the partial anticipation results, the filing date effect is negatively (but now insignificantly) related to firm size.
The Filing Date Effect regressions in
There are several differences in the filing date effect regression compared to the partial anticipation regression. First, the previous lawsuit dummy is now significantly positive (coefficient estimate = -0.4870 and p-value 0.002). Since we have previously argued that investors act as if they believe that firms have learned from past mistakes, the positive coefficient suggests that investors revise this earlier assessment when faced with evidence to the contrary. Second, the litigation intensity variable also reflects a partial reversal relative to the amount that is partially anticipated (coefficient estimate = -0.0698 and p-value 0.005).
Similar reversal holds for the squared term of litigation intensity. Third, the coefficient for the regulation dummy variable is significantly negative, which suggests that the relatively high levels of monitoring faced by these firms tends to result in lawsuits that are not as damaging as those for other firms. Finally, the discretionary accruals and standardized unexpected earnings effect effectively reverse so that the net effect is zero.
Cumulative Own Effect
The cumulative own effects regression considers the determinants of the total economic effects. Some of the explanatory variables are expected to help explain the losses that are capitalized prior to the filing of an actual lawsuit, even though they are not expected to be important determinants of the total economic losses. For example, conditional on observing a significant misstatement or omission of fact, it may be relatively easier to infer whether a lawsuit is forthcoming. There is, however, no similar basis for inferring that the size of the cumulative own effect should be positively or negatively related to the propensity to be sued because the size of the loss is related to the nature of the impropriety rather than the probability that a mistake was made.
Other factors are expected to be significant determinants of the cumulative own effect.
For example, given the nature of the negotiations that produce out of court settlements (the typical outcome of a class action lawsuit), the ability to pay is expected to be an important final determinant. Table 7 reports the results of the Cumulative Own Effect regressions. We can see that the cumulative economic losses are unrelated to the propensity to be sued; the coefficient estimate for Lawsuit Propensity is insignificantly different from zero (p-value of 0.404). Comparing these results to those for the partial anticipation and the filing date effect, the presence of deep pockets is one of the primary determinants of investors' cumulative response.
In summary, the evidence based on sued-firms suggests that as hypothesized, the partial anticipation effect is positively related to the propensity to be sued, the filing date effect is negatively related to the propensity to be sued, and the cumulative own effect is unrelated to the propensity to be sued. We next examine in Section 7.2 the robustness of these results when we consider the time lag between the trigger and filing dates, the type of lawsuit, and when we define partial anticipation as a fraction of the cumulative own effect.
Robustness Checks
We examine the robustness of our results from Table 7 in five distinct ways. In Section 7.2.1 we consider whether confounding effects, such as earnings announcements during the lawsuit announcement window, exaggerate our results. Section 7.2.2 examines whether the time lag between the trigger and filing dates influences our results. In Section 7.2.3 we consider the type of lawsuit in our analysis. That is, rather than examine whether a firm is sued or not, we use a multinomial logit model to investigate whether a firm is sued or not, and if so what type of a lawsuit is filed on the firm. As in Table 7 , we determine if investor reactions are related to the predicted probability from the multinomial logit model. In Section 7.2.4, we propose a direct test of the Partial Anticipation Hypothesis by asking what fraction of the cumulative own effect is anticipated prior to the lawsuit filing date.
Confounding effects
One possible concern is that the spillover effects for non-sued firms may be attributable to earnings announcements that occur within the lawsuit announcement period. Recall that Section 4 shows that even after controlling for simultaneous earnings announcements, there is evidence of a spillover effect. We revisit this issue and examine the robustness of our main hypotheses regarding partial anticipation and filing date effects (Hypotheses 1 and 2) by removing sued and non-sued firms that announce earnings within the lawsuit announcement window.
To check the robustness of the results reported in Tables 6 and 7 , we replicate the analysis using those firms that do not have confounding announcements. The results are reported in Table 8 . The probit estimates of the propensity to be sued (not reported here) are qualitatively similar to those in Table 6 .
34 Similar to Table 7 , Table 8 shows that investor reactions to the filing of class action lawsuits continue to support of our main hypotheses regarding partial anticipation and filing date effects.
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For completeness, we also replicate the analysis in Tables 6 and 7 Table 7 in each case. Accordingly, we conclude that after controlling for firms that announce earnings within the lawsuit announcement window, our empirical evidence supports our main hypotheses.
Investor reactions and time-lag between trigger and filing dates
Since some improprieties are harder to detect, it may take investors longer than a few days to determine whether a trigger event contains sufficient evidence to warrant initiating litigation.
This section examines whether the time lag between the trigger and filing dates influences our results.
Following Griffin, Grundfest and Perino (2000), we construct an indicator variable (Rapid filing dummy) that captures whether or not a class action lawsuit has been filed within twoweeks of a trigger date, and augment our regressions in Table 7 with this variable. In determining trigger dates, we searched on Factiva for identifiable trigger events between the lawsuit filing date and the end of class period. The class period is a period over which it is alleged that investors are misinformed about the price of the company's securities. The class period ends at the time of a corrective disclosure (i.e., similar to our trigger event), which informs investors of the possibility of misleading or omitted information. If we find an identifiable trigger event we use that date, and if not, we use the end of class period as the trigger date.
Our results, tabulated in Table 9 , are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 . In particular, the partial anticipation effect is positively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.016), the filing date effect is negatively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.001), and the cumulative own effect is unrelated to the propensity to be sued. As expected, there is strong evidence that a lawsuit filed within two-weeks of the trigger date will result in a larger filing date effect (since it captures the announcement effects of both the trigger date and the resolution of residual uncertainty on lawsuit filing date) and consequently a larger cumulative own effect. However, there is no relation between the partial anticipation effect and whether a lawsuit is filed within two weeks of the trigger date. In other words, partial anticipation of lawsuits based on an actual lawsuit filing is economically meaningful as reflected in the partial anticipation effect whether or not such a lawsuit was filed soon after the trigger date since a trigger event does not fully reveal whether a lawsuit is impending.
Investor reactions and lawsuit type
We extend the analysis in Section 7.1 by estimating the probability that a particular type of lawsuit is filed (rather than whether any lawsuit is filed against the firm). Specifically, we tabulate the outcomes sequentially, i.e., not sued = 1, accounting suit = 2, operations suit = 3, external business conditions suit = 4, questionable FI practices suit = 5, and other suit = 6, and estimate the probability of a given lawsuit type using a multinomial logit model based on the full set of regressors in Table 6 . In other words, lawsuit propensity is estimated from a multinomial logit model that incorporates the lawsuit types as described above rather than from a probit model. This multinomial logit methodology has the advantage of providing an estimate for the propensity to be sued for a particular type of misrepresentation or material omission of fact (e.g., accounting) rather than for any misrepresentation or material omission of fact − the probit model provides an estimate of the latter.
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As in Table 7 , Table 10 documents regressions of partial anticipation, filing date effect, and cumulative own effect on the lawsuit propensity estimated from a multinomial logit model, and the other regressors used in Table 7 .
Our results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 . In particular, the partial anticipation effect is positively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.074), the filing date effect is negatively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.005), and the cumulative own effect is unrelated to the propensity to be sued.
As an additional robustness check, we add indicator variables corresponding to the lawsuit types to the regressions in Table 10 . The results (not reported here) are qualitatively unchanged. In particular, the partial anticipation is positively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.083), the filing date effect is negatively related to the propensity to be sued (p-value of 0.015), and the cumulative own effect is unrelated to the propensity to be sued. The explanatory power improves upon inclusion of lawsuit type indicator variables to 0.1346, 0.1028 and 0.0874 as compared to those in Table 10 . 
Capitalized losses (fraction) and the propensity to be sued
This section proposes a more powerful test of the Partial Anticipation Hypothesis. A drawback with evaluating the relation between investor reactions to the filing of class action lawsuits and the propensity to be sued is that there may be a substantial fixed cost component to the cumulative economic losses.
A more direct test is to ask what fraction of the cumulative own effect is anticipated prior to the filing date. The advantage of this approach is that it controls for the size of the economic losses. Since investors partially anticipate lawsuit filings, we expect to find that the proportion of the cumulative own effect that is partially anticipated is positively related to the propensity to be sued.
We measure the fraction of legal liability that is partially anticipated as the ratio of the firm-specific industry spillover to the cumulative own effect, i.e.,
Even though this estimate is a "fraction", it is possible for it to be fall outside of the [0, 1] interval. For example, when the filing date announcement reveals that the lawsuit is not as large as previously anticipated the
Since investors have implicitly capitalized the entire loss prior to its announcement, it is economically sensible to set F P A ij [τ 1 , τ 2 ] to 1. As a result, values of F P A ij [τ 1 , τ 2 ] less than 0 and greater than 1 are respectively truncated at 0 and 1.
The Partial Anticipation hypothesis predicts that F P A ij [τ 1 , τ 2 ] is positively correlated with the probability that a firm is sued. Since the dependent variable is constrained to lie between 0 and 1, we test the hypothesis by estimating a logistic regression model. The specification includes the set of variables in Table 7 .
As expected, Table 11 indicates that there is a statistically significant and positive relation between the fraction of the shareholder losses that are partially anticipated by investors and the propensity to be sued. The coefficient estimates for the propensity score are positive and 29 statistically significant across both specifications (p-values of 0.001 or lower).
The explanatory power of the full model in Table 11 is comparable to that of the partial anticipation regression in Table 7 . The litigation environment variables are highly significant and the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 . Specifically, the partial anticipation effect is higher in industries with significant litigation activity (p-value of 0.0003), albeit it has the opposite effect for excessively high industry litigation activity (as measured by the squared term of litigation intensity).
Clearly, the partial anticipation result for the sued firms is robust even when we define the partial anticipation as a fraction of the cumulative own effect (rather than as a level)
.
In Section 8 we analyze whether the partial anticipation result holds for non-sued firms.
Industry Spillover and Non-Sued Firms
Lawsuits filed against particular firms may signal to investors that similar firms may also be sued. We predict that investors capitalize the expected losses associated with potential lawsuits and that the magnitude of this response is positively related to the probability of being sued. That is, investors apply bigger discounts to firms that are more likely to be sued.
This simply states that the partial anticipation hypothesis also holds for non-sued firms.
Hypothesis 3 (Partial Anticipation Hypothesis (Non-sued firms)) The level of partial anticipation for a non-sued firm prior to the lawsuit filing date of a sued firm in the same industry is positively related to the propensity to be sued.
We test this hypothesis by estimating a cross sectional regression of industry spillover (partial anticipation) using explanatory variables that include the propensity to be sued, the size of potential damages factors, the litigation environment, and firm-specific factors.
Consistent with the Partial Anticipation Hypothesis, Table 12 shows there is a significant positive relation between industry spillover and the likelihood of being sued in all the four OLS regressions.
To check the robustness of these results, we perform a second set of regression analysis based on a logistic regression where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if industry spillover for a given firm reflects a loss and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the Partial Anticipation Hypothesis, Table 12 shows there is a significant positive relation between industry spillover and the likelihood of being sued in three of the four Logistic regressions. Overall, since seven of the eight cases of regression analysis document a positive and statistically significant relationship between the level of partial anticipation and the likelihood of being sued for non-sued firms, we conclude that the partial anticipation hypothesis holds for non-sued firms as well.
Conclusions
We document economically large price reactions to the filing of class action lawsuits. Evidence presented indicates that investors partially anticipate expected losses from future lawsuits and that filing date effects understate the magnitude of shareholder losses. We demonstrate the importance of estimating cumulative own effects by showing that narrowly focusing on filing date regressions can lead to misleading inferences about shareholder wealth losses based on the likelihood of a firm being sued.
We do this in two steps. First, we show that investors partially anticipate future lawsuits and that expected losses are positively related to the propensity to be sued. Second, we show that investor reactions on the lawsuit filing date are negatively related to the propensity to be sued. For example, a firm that has a high propensity to be sued is likely to have a lower stock price decline on the lawsuit filing date since such an event was less of a surprise.
Therefore, if we simply consider the filing date results in isolation, we would mistakenly conclude that investors behave as if firms that are more likely to be sued are expected to have smaller losses rather than recognizing it as a consequence of the early positive effect related to the market's attempt to capitalize expected losses. Table 7 . Lawsuit Propensity is estimated using a multinomial logit model that considers the type of lawsuit (not sued = 1, accounting = 2, operations = 3, external business conditions = 4, questionable FI practices = 5, and other = 6) and is based on the full set of regressors reported in Table 12 : Spillover regressions for non-sued firms. This table reports the coefficient estimates, and the level of statistical significance of regressions that measure the valuation spillover effect of class action lawsuit incidence on 5,687 non-sued firms from the same industry (i.e., same four digit SIC code) as the sued firm during 1996-2003. The dependent variable for the regression in the left four panels is the industry spillover for the non-sued firm, i.e., the level of partial anticipation for a non-sued firm prior to the lawsuit filing date of a sued firm in the same industry. The dependent variable for the regression in the right four panels is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the industry spillover for the non-sued firm (defined above) reflects a loss and zero otherwise. The independent variables are: Lawsuit Propensity is based on probit estimation of the full model using the same share ownership variable as in table 12 in Table 6 . Share ownership (percent, dollar, log, frac) is the dollar value of CEO shareholdings, measured in percent, millions, natural log of market value in millions, and as a fraction of total annual compensation respectively. The remaining independent variables are as defined in Appendix A. The standard errors and pvalues associated with the ordinary least squares estimates are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. a, b, and c respectively indicate that the Chi-square test of the null hypothesis that the parameter estimate equals zero is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Description OLS Regressions Logistic Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Cumulative Own Effect. This figure illustrates how the cumulative own effect calculation reflects industry spillover and own effects. Gray boxes indicate dates on which a specific firm j is sued and represent the own effect component (also known as filing date effect) denoted by equation (2) in the paper. White boxes indicate dates on which other firms in the same industry are sued and represent the spillover effects on firm j. Partial anticipation cumulates the spillover effects on firm j prior to the lawsuit filing date on firm j as shown in equation (7) in the paper. In the event that a firm has been sued multiple times, the partial anticipation calculation is reset to zero after each lawsuit. In other words, the partial anticipation associated with the second lawsuit on firm j is composed of spillover effects subsequent to the first lawsuit on firm j that precede the filing date of the second lawsuit on firm j (i.e., in response to lawsuits 5 and 6 in that industry). Cumulative own effect is the sum of the partial anticipation effect (which reflects the industry spillover) and the own effect (also known as filing date effect) as shown in equation (6) in the paper.
